France should, by all logic, be firmly governed by the right. Decades of left-wing policies have produced catastrophic results: the “Great Replacement” is all but completed in Paris and its suburbs, and well underway elsewhere. Islam is omnipresent. Crime is soaring. The education system is collapsing. Industry has vanished. The national debt has exploded. Growth is stagnant, smothered by the highest tax burden in the developed world.
No surprise, then, that anxiety and frustration dominate public sentiment. The French people watch helplessly as their country loses its former glow. The France of Amélie Poulain has become the land of the veiled, overweight welfare-dependent binational. And yet, since 2012, France has been governed—without interruption—by the center-left.
The last right-wing president was Nicolas Sarkozy. Since then, the country has been led either by conventional social-democrats, like the bland François Hollande (2012-2017), or by technocratic social-democrats, like the arrogant Emmanuel Macron ((2017–present). And despite Macron’s disastrous record, the path to power remains uphill for the French right.
Why? Because France may well be the most hostile environment in the Western world for conservative or free-market ideas. Worse still, the very movements that claim to represent the right are themselves fragmented, uninspiring and fighting one another. The French right is a sick man—un homme malade—as weakened and confused as the country it claims it can save.
From Eldest Daughter of the Church to Godchild of the Left
Once, France was proud to call herself the eldest daughter of the Church—the main province of Roman Catholicism, guardian of its values and its universal aspirations. Today, France is better described as the eldest daughter of the Left—the Western nation where leftist ideology holds the deepest cultural and institutional roots.
It is the only democracy where socialism thrives without needing tanks in the streets or closed borders. Not because it was imposed, but because it is internalized—by the elites, by the institutions, and even by many who vote for the right. Redistribution is seen not just as policy, but as moral good. The welfare state is viewed not as a system, but as a secular angel.
The French elite institutions—judges, professors, media commentators, senior bureaucrats—are the clergy of this new socialist church. Progressive pundits are its priests and monks. Its gospel? Abortion, euthanasia, gay marriage, open borders, confiscatory taxation, state intervention. This has become the French consensus. A new religion now rules France: the religion of Progress—pushing ever further the boundaries of what is tolerated, and what is celebrated.
But it wasn’t always this way. Before World War II, France leaned toward laissez-faire capitalism. In 1945, under pressure from the Communists and as punishment for blatant collaboration with the Nazis, large sectors were nationalized: Renault, Crédit Lyonnais, coal, electricity, aviation, and more. A new class of technocrats—smart, honest, and efficient—took control and sidelined entrepreneurs. The system worked: the 1950s and 60s were an âge d’or, with strong growth, rising incomes, and generous redistribution.
The Left, however, needed an original sin to justify its moral supremacy. It found it in Vichy. By rewriting the history of the Collaboration and erasing its own role in it, the Left placed all blame on the Right. This historical fraud reached its peak in the 1980s under François Mitterrand—himself a former Vichy functionary—who carefully hid his past.
Since then, to declare oneself conservative is to risk being labeled a fascist. Anti-racism and anti-antisemitism have been weaponized with surgical precision. French voters act like professional beavers: at every election, they build a dam to block the “far right.” In runoff votes, they are called upon to support “the enemy of fascism”—even if it means voting against their own preferences.
The result? The Right, desperate to maintain respectability, follows the Left’s lead on every major issue.
The Rigged Game
France’s electoral system is built to keep the outsiders out. If the country used a first-past-the-post system, Marine Le Pen would likely already be president or prime minister. In the 2024 parliamentary elections, her party, the Rassemblement National (RN), won 31% of the first-round vote—but only secured 123 out of 577 seats.
The two-round system, combined with the “beaver dam” effect, locks her out of power.
In such a system—rigged by media pressure, ideological conformity, and electoral engineering—only exceptional leaders can break through. Leaders with the courage to defy the rules, the vision to impose their own agenda, and the skill to build coalitions rather than eat their allies alive.
The current right-wing leadership has shown none of these qualities. One must ask: do they even want to win?
The Domesticated Right
The biggest losers are Les Républicains (LR), France’s version of the pre-Trump GOP—filled with RINOs. They fear Islam and mass immigration, yet dare not mention the Great Replacement. They praise free markets, yet worship the state. They are a Right under Leftist supervision.
They still benefit from the prestige of being the heirs of Gaullism—but in truth, they’ve betrayed it. De Gaulle stood for sovereignty and strategic independence. Today’s LR bows to Brussels and Washington. They already wrote off France as a world-class power, De Gaulle’s worst dream.
They surrendered their convictions to please the Left—and got nothing in return. Macron poached their voter base: retirees afraid of inflation. They are dying, slowly but surely. And the only reason they still exist is that the alternative—the RN—is still not convincing enough for many.
Populist in name only
The Rassemblement National is often called populist—but it isn’t, really. It’s been tamed. Marine Le Pen severed all ties with her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, who was notorious for his revolutionary instincts. She expelled him from the party he had founded before rebranding it and changing its name from Front National to Rassemblement National. The former was widely seen as a hardline, far-right movement, tainted by accusations of antisemitism, racism, and neo-Nazi infiltration. The latter presents itself as a mainstream political force that has made peace with Europe, NATO, and the welfare state. It is led by a woman better known for her six cats than for any outrageous statement. How could someone affectionately known as a “cat mum” possibly be running a neo-Nazi party?
And yet, the establishment continues to smear Marine Le Pen and demonise her supporters. The more restrained commentators now prefer to call them “populists” rather than “far-right extremists”.
RN isn’t populist; it’s popular. It represents the white working class—the petit blanc—who fled the inner cities due to gentrification and immigration. They once voted Communist or Socialist, at a time where France was still an industrial country. Now they vote for Marine—who speaks their language and suffers the same media contempt they do.
As the crisis deepens, she’s winning over the lower middle class, besieged by inflation and crime. But despite being the largest party in France, RN still lacks cultural legitimacy. People hide their support for Marine. Her popularity resembles a cyst, not a muscle—swelling, not strengthening.
Worse, Marine may not even want to win. She collapsed in presidential debates in 2017 and 2022. Her party invests little in think tanks, intellectuals, or metapolitics. Some suspect her real goal is not power, but full integration into the system—even if it means disowning her father’s legacy.
The Ostracized Right
This is the diagnosis offered by Reconquête!—the party of Éric Zemmour, journalist and best-selling author. He accuses Le Pen of selling out. He has put the Great Replacement front and center. He advocates neoliberal reform where Marine demands wealth taxes and early retirement for everyone.
Zemmour is hated more than Marine because he says what she no longer dares to. His presence has, ironically, helped her appear more moderate by contrast.
He’s no populist. He’s an elitist. He believes in a vanguard, a select few capable of saving France. He and his vice president, Sarah Knafo, are inspired by Milei, Bukele, and Trump. In their view, the time for moderation is over.
Both are French Jews of North African origin—Zemmour from Algeria, Knafo from Morocco. Perhaps this background makes them especially sensitive to the risks of Islamic governance. They are cultured, sharp, and policy-savvy. Although they call for an alliance with RN, they show some contempt for Marine’s limited intellectual sophistication.
Still, being right isn’t enough. Zemmour only scored 7% in the 2022 election. Many voters chose Marine out of strategic calculation. Others simply feared radical change. The French want a painless cure for a terminal illness. They want to fix cancer with aspirin.
The Marginalized Sovereigntists
FREXIT remains politically toxic. Even among conservatives, most oppose it. The propaganda has been too effective. Comfort has dulled political courage.
That’s why the true nationalists—Asselineau, Philippot, Dupont-Aignan—remain marginal, polling at 3–4%. They are banned from mainstream media, caricatured as extremists, and forced to campaign online. Despite their clarity and coherence, their voices remain faint. Their egos don’t help either. They can not have a civilized conversation and agree on some sort of alliance.
Can the Right Be Saved—And Save France?
While the left unites despite its internal ideological struggles, no one knows if the French right can overcome its fragmentation.
Only the unpredictable may force unity and cooperation. RN needs human capital and lacks experience in government; LR and the small parties have competent cadres. But RN holds the cards—it’s the strongest player, and it will dictate strategy.
And the unpredictable has already arrived, delivered as a gift to the RN by the establishment. Last spring, a Parisian court found Marine Le Pen and some of her associates guilty of embezzlement, accusing them of directing EU parliamentary staff to work for them in Paris rather than focusing solely on EU matters. As a result, the unexpected happened: Marine was declared ineligible and will be unable to stand for president unless she is retried and acquitted before the election scheduled for May 2027. The appeals court has promised to reach a verdict by summer 2026, giving Marine enough time to prepare. However, should she lose the appeal or if elections are called earlier than expected, her deputy, Jordan Bardella, will step up.
Bardella has learned some of the hard lessons that Marine seems unwilling to accept. Firstly, he advocates for an alliance among all right-wing factions. Secondly, he is young (born in 1995, almost Gen Z!) and good-looking. His tailored suits and gentle, almost charming manner are assets with female voters, who are usually wary of extremism. He’s the ideal “son-in-law” type. Thirdly, he has no Le Pen blood running through his veins, unlike Marine, or Marion, her talented and attractive niece who is also involved in politics. The French, who sometimes seem to hold on to the idea of hereditary guilt, will take note.
In fact, Jordan is the complete opposite of Jean-Marie Le Pen: he hasn’t served in the paratroopers, hasn’t lost an eye, and doesn’t use profanities. He passes the “toxic masculinity” test. Above all, he’s smarter than most analysts give him credit for. Though he lacks a stellar academic record and significant professional experience, he learns quickly. In 2024, when the RN won the European parliamentary election, he came across as unprepared and arrogant. Today, he speaks like a good lawyer—knowledgeable enough on complex issues to project competence, yet humble enough to inspire empathy.
Bardella is an improvement on Marine, but he is certainly no De Gaulle. He has a je-ne-sais-quoi reminiscent of young Jacques Chirac, the “boy next door” you would happily invite for a beer anytime.
Assuming the Right regains power, can it actually save France? The crisis now spans every domain: moral, financial, political, diplomatic, military, urban, rural, cultural, spiritual. It is not a crisis—it is a stroke and a heart attack at the same time.
And beneath it all, a central question: how do you govern a country with 10 million Muslims, many of whom will never assimilate? France needs a new social contract—one in which non-assimilation does not equal takeover. A deal where those who reject French norms are not treated as equals to those who uphold them.
What a terrible time to be in charge.
Yet this has always been the fate of the French right. The Left throws the party; the Right is called in to clean up the mess.
In 1940, the Front Populaire lost the war. Pétain dealt with the wreckage. In 1958, De Gaulle returned to resolve the Algerian quagmire—again left by the Socialists.
Life isn’t fair. Politics even less so. Victory won’t come from being right. It will come from being lucky—and being ready.
Originally published in The Salisbury Review.


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